Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The focus of this paper is the Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS), a relatively new system the Army is in the process of implementing to more effectively measure readiness of individual Army units and the collective readiness of the Army as an institution. I believe the study of SRS is instructive for several reasons relevant to NWC Course 5603. It provides real-world examples of the course's framework of people, organization and process and SRS remains both a topical and contentious issue within the Army. As I discussed when getting approval for this topic, although there has been some inter-agency coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress, implementing SRS is primarily an example of intra-agency challenges because it is so different from the long-standing readiness reporting system the Army has had for decades.
PART II --READINESS REPORTING HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
The readiness reporting system defined in AR 220-1 evolved as part of an HQDA initiative to have a more accurate picture of Army-wide readiness under a standardized set of criteria. The need for such visibility and standardization was brought to light during the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The publication of AR 220-1 was an attempt by HQDA to codify unit readiness reporting against standards based on the requirements for sustained combat. Initially, the regulation only applied to active Army units that had a combat mission and were part of what was then known as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). For decades, the acronym STRAC meant one thing in the Army--well-trained soldiers and units.
From 1963 to 1978, the Army's readiness reporting requirements were modified eight times to adapt to changing conditions. Coverage expanded from just STRAC units to additional tactical units (known as TO&E units), some units without a go-to-war mission (known as TDA units) and also expanded to include some Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units. The first systemic use of computers in readiness reporting occurred in 1969 and was called the Army Force Status Reporting System. That version of AR 220-1 was also the first to designate separate reporting systems for the active Army and the ARNG and USAR.
In 1971, DoD initiated its own readiness reporting requirements and the Army's readiness report contributed significantly to the new DoD readiness reporting system. However, despite the requirement that the Army now had to provide readiness data to DoD, the Army's internal readiness report did not change significantly and the Army continued to administer its own independent readiness reporting system. Another important change that occurred in 1971 was the frequency for readiness reporting within the Army changed from quarterly to monthly.
In 1976, the Army War College (AWC), based at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, analyzed readiness reporting in-depth for the first time. According to a colonel on the Army Staff who routinely deals with readiness issues, the 1976 AWC study determined the existing readiness system in place at the time, "fostered inflated reports based on non-empirical data and that field commanders had little faith in the system."
2 In response to the 1976 AWC study, the Army modified its readiness reporting system and instituted the Unit Status Report (USR) in 1979 with yet another revision to AR 220-1. A key component of the USR was the inclusion of C-ratings (C-1 being highest rating and C-4 lowest rating) for four key criteria: personnel readiness, equipment availability, equipment readiness and training readiness. From 1976 to 1997, the USR and the reports generated from USR data were modified several times to account for unique joint and reserve component considerations. In 1986, the Army adopted the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) to better support joint requirements.
-2-
The current version of AR 220-1 was published and implemented in 1999. As was true when I was a young Army officer in the early 1980s, today's lieutenants still use AR 220-1 as their primary reference document to prepare monthly readiness reports for their company commanders who are typically captains. The monthly readiness reports at company level are submitted in hard copy to their battalion headquarters, and proceed up through the chain of command. Most battalions also require company commanders to brief the readiness of their unit in person at monthly meetings logically referred to as USR briefs, which are normally attended by officer and noncommissioned officer leaders within the battalion.
This same scenario is frequently repeated at higher levels, such as at brigade level when lieutenant colonel battalion commanders brief the readiness of their commands to a colonel brigade commander, and at division level, when brigade commanders brief the readiness of their commands to a two-star division commander. for an independent study of the requirements for a comprehensive readiness reporting system for DoD.
PART III--EXTERNAL INFLUENCES NECESSITATING CHANGE
DoD tasked the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to conduct the independent review of its readiness reporting system. The project leader for the review was John C. Tillson, whose team consisted of 11 other IDA researchers. Several prominent former flag officers from the services also assisted with the study, including
Gen. Wesley Clark (USA, Ret.), Gen. Wayne Downing (USA, Ret.), Gen. Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret.) and Adm. Harold Gehman (USN, Ret.). The key findings produced by the IDA study are shown below.
"DoD's readiness reporting has been improved substantially in recent years, but further improvements are needed. These include: providing comprehensive readiness reporting guidance; addressing the full range of National Security Strategy (NSS) requirements; focusing on mission-essential tasks for both military operations and support; developing capabilities to evaluate overall system readiness; and developing better management information systems for collecting, processing, and reporting relevant readiness data. These improvements collectively will provide the Secretary of Defense and the Congress much better understanding of DoD's readiness to execute all elements of the strategy." Gen. Shinseki tasked the War College to develop alternative solutions to improve readiness reporting and design a reporting system that directly answers the question: "Ready for what?" Shinseki also approved the underlying problem statement for the War College Readiness Committee, which defined the scope of their duties.
The problem statement Gen. Shinseki approved is shown below:
"The current reporting system is not sufficiently comprehensive, accurate, objective, timely and predictive in its measurement of the Army's ability to support the National Military Strategy and does not facilitate the allocation of resources to maximize readiness across the Army."
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For brevity purposes, I won't provide all of the findings and recommendations of the 1999 AWC Readiness
Study. However, the study's key conclusion was, "The current readiness reporting system deficiencies warrant major improvements." 
PART IV--KEY DETAILS AND COMPONENTS OF SRS
The Strategic Readiness System (SRS) was designed as an integrated strategic management and measurement system that will revolutionize the way the Army thinks about and reports readiness. The system helps ensure that all levels of the Army recognize and align their vision, objectives and initiatives to those articulated in an overarching Army Plan produced at the Pentagon. Additionally, SRS measures each element's progress toward achieving these goals. HQDA and the major commands have already begun working with SRS. By
September 2003, the process will expand further to include additional units. SRS displays the status of strategic objectives as red, amber or green (green being the most positive characterization) on what is called a scorecard.
The colors indicate the degree of success toward achieving strategic objectives. Before producing their scorecards, commanders are asked to produce a mission map, which helps identify their core competencies. A model of a strategy-focused organization and a sample mission map are shown at Enclosure 1.
SRS will transform the way the Army manages and measures readiness by focusing and aligning strategic goals and objectives across the entire force. It takes into account the significant number of units and activities within the Army whose readiness is not assessed by current readiness reporting standards and broadens the Army's definition of readiness to include installations, infrastructure, the industrial base, etc.
SRS does not replace the current Unit Status Report; it integrates the data required by our current readiness reporting system with other data--such as from institutional elements of the Army that have not previously been part of the Army's existing readiness assessment--and provides a more holistic view of readiness. It provides Army leaders down to the Division and separate Brigade level with a tool that will help in prioritizing the allocation of resources to maximize overall readiness.
- 5- In line with Gen. Shinseki's initial guidance, and different from today's USR reporting system, SRS enables senior Army leaders to monitor the ability of the Army to achieve its stated strategic objectives and core competencies. SRS is designed to link resources to readiness, while also leveraging available technologies to more accurately forecast the effects of resource allocation decisions. This will be accomplished by identifying the strategic objectives of all elements of the Army above separate Brigade level and evaluating progress toward achieving those objectives through use of clearly articulated metrics.
SRS consists of two parts. The first part identifies a unit's strategic goals and objectives. It is based on a balanced scorecard, an administrative tool that was the brainchild of two Harvard Business School professors: January 2003 is the first time SRS-generated readiness data will be briefed at the Army's Monthly
Readiness Review (MRR), the key readiness meeting attended by the senior leadership of the Army that always precedes the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMMR) held on the Joint Staff. Using SRS-generated data at the MRR is an important milestone in the relatively young history of SRS.
PART V--SRS PROVIDES REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES OF COURSE 5603 FRAMEWORK
I believe SRS is a worthwhile case study that exemplifies many of the bureaucratic challenges we have identified throughout Course 5603. In this section, I provide examples of the Army's experiences thus far with SRS and discuss how they reinforce the importance of people, organization and process in any major undertaking within a bureaucracy.
PEOPLE.
When he was Army Chief of Staff back in the early 1970s, Gen. Creighton Abrams emphasized that people aren't merely in the Army; people are the Army. Perhaps more so than any other organization in the United States, the ability of the Army to successfully perform the full spectrum of missions it is assigned is directly related to the quality and dedication of its people. Quality people are the reason the Army repeatedly does more with less and can perform what oftentimes seems miraculous to people outside of the Army. As Gen. Dennis J.
Reimer, Army Chief of Staff from 1995-99, said repeatedly, "Soldiers are our credentials."
However, like other people organizations, the Army is not immune to the typical people problems, including resistance to change, wide range of intellectual capacities--even among senior officials, biases, many different personalities which don't always support each other or the boss, self-promotional individuals, etc. All of these nuances and many others have been evident in the effort to implement SRS.
Since the Army is a traditional hierarchy, where rank almost always wins out and has the final say, one of the key reasons why SRS has come this far in such a relatively short period of time is that Army Chief of Staff Shinseki is firmly behind the program and has basically told his generals to get on board. Along this vein, according to a GS-15 on the Army Staff who is involved on an almost daily basis with some aspect of SRS, "There's no doubt about it, the chief of staff is the primary reason SRS has gained momentum. Without his personal support and involvement, SRS would never have gotten off the ground. 7 "
"To master our strategic transition, we must focus on the other two components of the Army vision: people and readiness…The magnificent Army we see busily deployed abroad today will remain the force of choice should this Nation go to war anytime in the next 15 years…To more accurately measure Army readiness, we are developing a new reporting system that reflects active and reserve component capability to meet the requirements of today's strategic environment." Part of Gen. Shinseki's challenge in gaining support for many of his programs in and outside of the Army is he doesn't appear to have a self-promotional bone in his body. He has never felt compelled to justify his many contentious decisions in public (see below), does not appear to be skilled in building consensus or followings, and almost never speaks with the media. Collectively, these attributes makes him at times appear like an out-of-touch recluse--even to the many people who respect him as a selfless soldier. Like other large bureaucracies, the Army fundamentally is resistant to change. The Army grew accustomed doing more with less during the Clinton years and developed an institutional aversion to adding anything new to an already overflowing plate unless it was possible to take something off, which was rarely the case. -8- One senior officer I spoke with concluded there were two active organizational impediments to SRS.
ORGANIZATION. The Army Headquarters in the Pentagon
First, the Army was being asked to implement SRS without being provided any additional resources. "Shinseki intentionally did not provide any additional resources because he truly believed the balanced scorecard process, if properly implemented, would lead to greater efficiency in the Army and would actually take stuff off the plate instead of adding more stuff on it." It was left up to the senior commanders implementing SRS to either add the fairly rigorous intellectual effort on top of everything they were already doing, or to effectively use the scorecard system to identify key organizational objectives and impose those key objectives over the current workload and stop doing things not directly supporting the key objectives.
The second organizational impediment was a somewhat obstructionist mindset of the senior Army officer Acknowledging that it is nearly impossible to teach an old dog new tricks, the people within the Army responsible for SRS at HQDA level have focused most of their efforts on getting corporate buy-in at the rank of major and below and on the brigadier general population. The organizational dilemma facing the Army as it attempts to fully implement SRS seems to be directly related to Jervis' hypothesis that states, "Decision makers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being willing to alter their theories."
PROCESS.
The key ingredients within the course framework for process are turf, history, stakes and personalities. All four of those ingredients have influenced SRS thus far.
Turf has been a factor because some commanders resent the fact that SRS forces them to align their priorities with the Army's overall priorities as identified by the Army Chief of Staff. While it may seem illogical at best and disloyal at worst, the fact is some four-star commanders don't feel compelled to integrate their own organizational objectives with those of the Chief of Staff. Some of this resistance is culture-driven and some of it is personality-driven. In terms of culture, some Army four-stars see themselves as commanders and the Chief of Staff as a staff officer; in the Army, a staff officer is never held in the same esteem as a field commander. The generals with this view do not fully embrace SRS and the work its implementation is causing--especially since they are not being provided any additional resources and nobody is lessening their current workload in order to free up assets to implement SRS.
In terms of personalities, those senior officers who have yet to warmly embrace SRS know that Gen.
Shinseki is retiring this summer and that it is not certain the program will survive after his departure. This has led to a few senior officers noticeably dragging their feet. This is a common stall tactic we have all seen for years.
From one historical perspective, given the end of the Cold War and assumption of many new missions, it was inevitable the Army would have to adopt a new readiness system. In my view, the Army proceeded in a logical manner in searching for a new readiness reporting system by having the Army War College initially lead the effort.
The War College offered two advantages. First, officers at the school are not in the rating scheme of the Chief of Staff, so they were not constrained in any way other than addressing the specific areas Gen. Shinseki tasked them to address. The second advantage of having the AWC lead the effort was the College could tap into considerable expertise in the class in session, many whom had recently relinquished command of battalions and were knowledgeable of the current readiness challenges facing the Army.
Once Gen. Shinseki approved the AWC Committee's final report, the mission to develop and implement a new readiness reporting system was assigned to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans/G-3, the biggest staff activity on the Army Staff and one that already had oversight of readiness--including a two-star Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization and a colonel who leads a fairly robust Readiness Division. It was also logical for the Army to hire Collaborative Inc. as its primary SRS contractor since the firm's two senior officials developed the balanced scorecard and had experience helping produce strategy-focused organizations.
A second historical factor is many senior Army officers know that Gen. Shinseki was basically rendered a lame duck in April 2002, when his likely successor was named by DoD sources, almost a year earlier than the customary timeframe when a new service chief is named. Additionally, it has become evident over time that Gen.
Shinseki has not endeared himself to Secretary Rumsfield. The way DoD handled the cancellation of the Crusader artillery system and the fact that Gen. Keane--not Gen. Shinseki--was informed of the SECDEF's decision is not lost on the senior generals in the Army.
Gen. Shinseki's tour as Chief of Staff has also included other decisions that have been second-guessed by many senior officers, including the decision to go with wheeled vehicles in the Army's new more agile brigades instead of track vehicles as well as the decision to have conventional forces wear black berets, which for years were worn only by elite Ranger units. Collectively, this has resulted in a reluctance to embrace what many senior lieutenant colonels and above view as yet another bright idea being generated in the Pentagon by senior Army officials who have lost track with reality in the field.
In terms of more recent history, a third factor that has influenced the degree to which SRS has been accepted is the cacophony surrounding 9-11, ensuing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), ongoing peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the preparations for a possible war with Iraq, which have all entailed considerable training and deployments of Army units.
Readiness issues have always been the purview of commanders and operations officers. The truth is a significant percentage of the Army's senior commanders and their operations officers are actively involved in one of the activities mentioned in the previous paragraph--leaving them little time to invest into SRS.
Given this context, it's easy to see why many commanders are looking at SRS with some trepidation. This last predicament seems to align with Jervis' hypothesis that says, "When messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely." In the context of SRS, the receivers are the senior Army commanders who are already contending with many issues simultaneously that are keeping them busy for 14-16 hours a day.
PART VI--SUMMARY
Predictably, the Army's efforts to implement SRS have run into many of the bureaucratic challenges we have discussed throughout Course 5603. As with any major undertaking, it requires change from a long-standing status quo, a new set of competencies, and a willingness on people of all ranks to look at the same things they've been looking at for years--but in new ways. Like many things in our busy world, SRS has been widely perceived by many good-intentioned people as additional work--undesirable to someone who already feels over-worked. The seniority of key personalities within the bureaucracy has enabled considerable progress to be attained in a relatively short period of time. In this case, the four-star Army Chief of Staff, analogous to a private sector CEO, has seen the potential long-term benefits of SRS from the onset and been a champion of the program. Gen. Shinseki has also been successful in getting Secretary of the Army Thomas White to support SRS implementation.
Despite the personal involvement and backing of the Army's two senior leaders, there still is considerable angst in the ranks, including the general officer ranks. One explanation for this cool support in the field for a hot headquarters idea is that fundamentally, the Chief of Staff is paid to be a visionary--to look 10-20 years ahead and develop strategies and programs today to contend with anticipated future challenges. In contrast, the senior officers in the field commanding Brigades, Divisions, Corps and Major Commands are almost exclusively focused on accomplishing the missions they are assigned today or may be assigned tomorrow. As a group, they tend to not appreciate the panoply of new ideas generated by HQDA, especially when those new ideas add to their existing workload and do not come with additional resources, funding or manpower. The tension between "upper management" and "operators in the field" is present in all bureaucracies and the Army is no different.
In my view, it is too early to predict whether the full implementation of SRS will come to fruition. While there is strong support at the highest levels of the Army in the Pentagon, there also appears to be many senior Army officers who are skeptical at best on the merits of SRS. From my interviews, it was clear there is at least one fourstar in the Army who has yet to be convinced SRS is worth the time, effort and money. There will be a new Army
Chief of Staff in June 2003, and according to some people, the Secretary of the Army may also depart not long after. The long-term sustainability of SRS will be in the hands of their replacements.
The officer many people believe will be the next Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Another key potential variable that will presumably have a major impact on SRS implementation is if the United States goes to war with Iraq. Under such a scenario--which seems more likely every day given the fact we have nearly 100,000 American troops deployed in the Middle East--the Army's senior leadership would probably defer full implementation of SRS for many years or cancel it all together.
Nobody can say with certainly at this juncture what will come of SRS--whether it will be institutionalized or eventually set aside as a bright idea whose time had not yet come.
* * * *
